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Diving into the Wreck:
BP and Kenneth Feinberg's Gulf Coast
Gambit
George W. Conk*
Since the United States Supreme Court in Amchem Products
v. Windsor effectively ruled out class actions in mass tort claims,
the federal courts have continued to develop systems for
management of large-scale claims. Sometimes styled quasi-class
actions, the classic model is the consolidation of the discovery
process, followed by bellwether trials, and global settlement. The
process has been well described by Judge Eldon Fallon, whose
management of the Vioxx litigation in the Eastern District of
Louisiana is an exemplar of a successfully litigated global
* George W. Conk, Adjunct Professor of Law & Senior Fellow, Louis Stein
Center for Law & Ethics, Fordham Law School. Thanks are due to the
students in my Business Torts and Remedies seminars, particularly to
Michael Landis, J.D. and Patrick Dorime, J.D. expected 2012, for their
research and writing on the issues. This paper was first presented on April
18, 2011 at the conference Blowout: the Legal Legacy of the Deepwater
Horizon Catastrophe. Thanks are also due to Roger Williams University Law
School Dean David Logan and to Susan Farady, Director of the Marine
Affairs Institute, who led the event, which is a model for those who embrace
engaged legal education.
1. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). The Court rejected an asbestos class action
saying that individual issues such as proof of causation of disease
predominated over common issues of fact. Id. at 628. Although the Court did
not formally declare that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23 class
actions could not be used in personal injury claims, it put an end to them as a
practical matter. See id. at 628-29.
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settlement. 2
In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe' BP
moved dramatically to get control of the process - hoping to use
the prestige, creativity, and capability of Kenneth Feinberg and
his firm to effectively pre-empt the complex, protracted, and costly
litigation process. 4  The purportedly independent method
developed by BP and Feinberg could be labeled "the pseudo-fund
model" of global settlement.
When in April 2010 the Deepwater Horizon rig burned and
the Macondo well it served began to spew thousands of gallons of
crude oil in what would be the world's largest oil spill, it was clear
to the well's developer/owner BP that massive damage claims
would also flow. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) charged BP
with strict liability for the costs of clean-up and the duty to pay
partial interim as well as final damages claims.5
BP moved boldly to gain control of the process. At a June 16,
2010 White House event, BP committed twenty billion dollars in
assets to meet its obligations to be paid over a four-year period,
and this amount is to be neither a floor nor a ceiling.6 It was
apparently a guesstimate of what might be needed, though by
January 11, 2011 BP had already reimbursed the United States
$606 million for clean-up costs, and BP now estimates its total
liability at forty-one billion dollars.7  The process would be
2. Eldon Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82
TuL. L. REV. 2323, 2323 (2008). See generally, DAVID F. HERR, ANNOTATED
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4d ed. 2011).
3. See Final Report, THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP HORIZON OIL
SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.oilspill
commission.gov/final-report (reporting on key events in the BP oil spill
disaster).
4. See, e.g., Molly K. Hooper, Feinberg Ordered by Obama to get BP
Claims Paid 'Quickly', THE HILL, (June 20, 2010, 4:30 PM), http://thehill.coml
blogs/e2-wire/677-e2-wire/104367-feinberg-ordered-by-obama-to-get-bp-claims
-paid-quickly (documenting Kenneth Feinberg's appointment to oversee the
oil spill compensation fund).
5. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2702, 2705 (2006).
6. Jesse Lee, A New Process and a New Escrow Account for Gulf Oil
Spill Claims from BP, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG, (June 17, 2010, 2:35 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/06/17/a-new-process-and-a-new-escrow-
account-gulf-oil-spill-claims-bp.
7. JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41679, LIABILITY
AND COMPENSATION ISSUES RAISED BY THE 2010 GULF OIL SPILL 1, 11 n.64
(2011), available at http://assets.openers.com/rpts/R41679_ 2 0 1 10 3 1 1.pdf.
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managed by a lawyer of solomonic reputation - Kenneth Feinberg.
He built that reputation beginning with the Agent Orange
settlement in the 1980's and culminating in his volunteer service
as government-appointed Special Master of the September 11
Victims Compensation Fund. His law firm Feinberg Rozen bills
itself as specialists in "comprehensive negotiations strategy," a
firm which has "redefined the practice of law," with lawyers
"preeminent" in "preventing years of protracted, costly and
uncertain litigation."8 BP needed just that. With President
Obama blessing the commitment and the selection of Feinberg, BP
set about the task of reaching an early global resolution.
Oversell and misrepresentation began from the first.
Feinberg sought from the first to wear the cloak of the public fund
he had administered. Four days after the White House
appearance, speaking on Meet the Press he said:
Now, I'm confident - as with the 9/11 fund - that if
claimants enter this fund voluntarily they will be treated
fairly. They're treated in a comprehensive way, they will
be given emergency payments with no requirement in
terms of waiving your right to sue. These emergency
payments are without condition. And then I think [we'll]
be able to treat everybody fairly ... I must make sure
that this $20 billion fund provides for prompt payment,
full compensation. It's an independent program. I'm not
beholden to the administration or BP.9
He was certainly not "beholden" to the Obama administration.
A full year later, Attorney General Holder noted in a letter to
8. Feinberg Rozen, LLP's website declares:
The firm has redefined the practice of law, bringing opposing sides of
legal disputes together. It is the nation's foremost law firm for
mediation, arbitration, other forms of alternative dispute resolution,
and negotiation strategy. From cases that affect only a few, to the
largest, most complex disputes of our time, the firm consistently
bridges the gap between parties by creating imaginative and
satisfying solutions. Time and again, the firm is able to achieve
settlements that are in every party's best interests, thus eliminating
the need for costly litigation.
About Feinberg Rozen, LLP, FEINBERG ROZEN, LLP, www.feinbergrozen.com
(also click "About Us") (last visited October 1, 2011) (emphasis added).
9. Hooper, supra, note 4. Feinberg, of course, was not "ordered" by
Obama to do anything.
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Feinberg only Feinberg's voluntary agreement to an "independent
audit" of the entity, which he leads for BP - the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility (GCCF).' 0 Because BP is statutorily compelled to satisfy
interim claims - a task for which mass tort litigation is
unequipped - Feinberg's claims payment "facility" has been the
main focus of activity. But, because the GCCF is private and
unregulated its criteria and performance are difficult to gauge and
it remains un-monitored. Though often referred to as a "fund," it
is in fact only a set-aside or promised commitment of assets by BP
in an amount that on its face appeared to be roughly sufficient to
settle governmental and private claims arising from the spill.
Like actual "funds," the GCCF is a mechanism that seeks to
resolve claims without resort to the courts, as Feinberg urged.
But, unlike litigated and mediated funds there is no highly
elaborated grid to guide the consensual administration and
determination of awards to claimants."
Although a "procedure for the payment or settlement of
claims for interim, short-term damages" is mandated by § 2705 of
the OPA,12 there is otherwise a regulatory vacuum. The private
operation functions through its own "protocols," which it
promulgates in language reminiscent of that of a public entity.
The GCCF has in fact been refractory to efforts to supervise it.
Plaintiffs' lawyers in the Multi-District Litigation (MDL) venued
in Louisiana have twice moved to "supervise" BP and Feinberg's
dealings with members of the "putative class."l 3 The first motion
10. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General, to Kenneth Feinberg, Gulf Coast Claims Facility (July 20,
2011) (on file with author), available at media.al.com/live/other/Holder
%201etter.pdf.
11. See, e.g., Examples of Claim Valuation Calculations, VIoxx
SETTLEMENT DOCUMENTS, http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/
Claimant%20Valuation%2OExamples.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2011). In the
World Trade Center Disaster cleanup cases a complex grid was devised to
determine awards. See World Trade Center Settlement Process Agreement, As
Amended, http://www.scribd.com/doc/46144665/WTC-9- 11-Cleanup-cases-
Final-Settlement-Agreement-as-amended (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
12. 33 U.S.C. § 2705 (2006).
13. See Memorandum in Support of Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment Denying Copeland's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction, and for Court Supervision at 18, In re Oil Spill by the
Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL
No. 2179 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 2010), ECF No. 44-1; Plaintiffs' Supplemental
Brief in Support of Supervision over the BP Interim Claims Process at 1-2, In
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yielded an order by Judge Barbier compelling Feinberg to stop
calling himself independent and to identify himself as an agent of
BP. 14
We begin with a look at the history of mass torts and some of
the reforms that have moved us away from the common law
system of trial by judge and jury. The GCCF is unlike workers
compensation systems, the administrative fund claims for
childhood vaccine injuries, the mass tort global settlements of
drug product liability cases, and the World Trade Center cleanup
workers cases. All of those yield awards that are the product of
open and adversarial processes with transparent measures of
damages. But the GCCF is entirely private, its liability principles
obscure, and its damages measures stated with such generality as
to leave the Administrator with wide discretion.'" Like the
September 11 Victims Compensation Fund to which it is otherwise
inaptly compared, the GCCF is characterized by the broad,
generally undefined discretion exercised by its administrator:
Kenneth Feinberg.
Since the GCCF is a private claims settlement agency owned
by the payor, none of the settlements, nor their basis is disclosed,
a process which has continued to draw complaints from the
plaintiffs who have filed suit against BP in actions consolidated
under MDL 2179 in Louisiana's Eastern District,' 6 and interested
public officials like Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood,' 7 and
re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April
20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. July 25, 2011).
14. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of
Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10497, at
*23-25 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011) (ordering Feinberg to "[r]efrain from referring
to the GCCF, Ken Feinberg, or Feinberg Rozen, LLP (or their
representatives), as 'neutral' or completely 'independent' from BP. It should
be clearly disclosed in all communications, whether written or oral, that said
parties are acting for and on behalf of BP in fulfilling its statutory obligations
as the 'responsible party' under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.").
15. See, e.g., Payment Options, Eligibility and Substantiation Criteria,
and Final Payment Methodology, GULF COAST CLAIMs FACILITY,
http://www.gulfcoast claimsfacility.com/methodologylanding (last visited Oct.
13, 2011) (describing methodology for claims determinations).
16. The wrongful death, personal injury, and Oil Pollution Act claims
arising from the April 2010 sinking of the rig were consolidated. In re Oil
Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20,
2010, 731 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (2010).
17. See, e.g. Statement of Interest on Behalf of the State of Mississippi,
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other Gulf Coast Attorneys General.18  The plaintiffs lawyers,
have asserted that delay in the interim claims process has been a
method of manipulating claimants desperate for cash who snap up
so-called quick payments (for which a general release of BP is
required) and forego the partial or interim claims to which the
statute entitles them without prejudice to making future claims
for permanent loss. 19
Ironically, one year after the White House ceremony, the Gulf
Coast plaintiffs lawyers asked that MDL Judge Carl Barbier to
appoint a Special Master to supervise the BP/GCCF
claims process in order to: (i) assure compliance with
OPA; (ii) ensure accurate and appropriate communication
with claimants; (iii) make findings and/or
recommendations regarding the satisfaction of OPA's
presentment requirements; and (iv) make findings and/or
recommendations regarding the scope and/or efficacy of
In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on
April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. filed Jan. 24, 2011), ECF No. 1060
("The GCCF is nothing more than a surrogate for BP in the administration of
the claims process that BP is required to provide claimants under the Oil
Pollution Act. . . . From the outset of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster
in the Gulf, the Gulf Coast State Attorneys General have attempted to
monitor and improve the manner in which the BP Oil Spill claims process
has been conducted. Their efforts began before the GCCF was created and
have continued thereafter, and have been undertaken on behalf of all Gulf
State citizens, even those who are not putative class members. These
communications have been composed of regular and ongoing meetings,
negotiations, and correspondence with BP and Mr. Feinberg for the purpose
of compelling BP to bring the GCCF claims process into compliance with the
requirements of federal law, including OPA, and the prior commitments
made by BP, the GCCF and Mr. Feinberg. These good-faith discussions have
unfortunately met with only limited success."); Press Release, Mississippi
Attorney General, Attorney General Seeks Court Action to Compel GCCF
and Feinberg Compliance of Subpoena (July 12, 2011), available at
http://www.ago.state.ms.us/index.php/printer-friendly/releases/attorney
general_seeks courtaction_to_compeLgccfand-feinberg-compliance ("Mr.
Feinberg and the GCCF have continually made promises of compliance, but
have failed to fully provide necessary information despite our repeated
requests and reasonable efforts to resolve the issues . . . All they have
managed to do is delay, deny, deceive and dissemble.").
18. See Correspondence from Gulf Coast State Attorneys General to
Kenneth Feinberg, attached as Exhibit A to Statement of Interest on Behalf
of the State of Mississippi, supra note 17.
19. See Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief in Support of Supervision over the
BP Interim Claims Process, supra note 13, at 8 & n.21, 9.
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releases. 20
Thus, after one year, the GCCF has failed to garner the
credibility as a neutral forum that BP sought, federal public
regulatory authority has been faint, and state regulation has
consisted of Attorneys Generals' laments.21 By default the MDL
court has been pressed into service by private litigants. That
government which governs least has not governed best.
We turn now to a historical survey of efforts to mold, modify,
and replace the tort system to provide prompt and effective
compensation to those who have suffered losses due to mass
disasters, unsafe workplaces, or heedlessly marketed products.
From that experience we conclude that the pseudo-fund model is
an inadequate mechanism for the Gulf Coast oil spill claimants,
and that stronger federal government regulation is warranted -
particularly for the partial and interim claims process mandated
by the OPA.
THE EMERGENCE OF MASS TORT CLAIMS:
INDUSTRIAL ILLNESS - A MODERN EPIDEMIC
We have been troubled by mass torts for over a hundred
years. Tort reform arose in the early twentieth century when the
emerging labor movement and social reformers forged a response
to the grievous epidemic of industrial accidents. 22 The common
law presented formidable obstacles to employer liability for
industrial accidents. But, driven by the railway workers unions'
political force, Congress in 1908 passed the first Federal
20. Id. at 20.
21. See Letter from Gulf Coast States Attorneys General to Rupert
Bondy, Grp. Gen. Counsel, BP P.L.L.C., Stephen R. Winters, Esq., Assoc.
Gen. Counsel, Refining and Mktg., Global BP Am. Inc, and Doug Suttles,
Chief Operating Officer, BP Exploration & Prod. Inc. (undated), available at
http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsflWF/JFAO-
856MR6/$file/StatesLetterBP.pdf; Sabrina Canfield, AGs Claim BP Given
Pass to 'Distort' & 'Subvert', COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, (April 11, 2011, 3:40
PM), http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/04/11/35663.htm.
22. See, e.g., Railroad Workers Injuries - Federal Employers' Liability
Act (FELA) Claims, ASHCRAFT & GEREL LLP, http://www.ashcraftand
gerel.com/practiceareas/railroad-worker-injuries-federal-employers-liability-
act-fela-claims/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) (noting that the passage of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act was motivated out of a concern for injury
and death associated with railroad work).
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Employers Liability Act. 23  "[It] was designed," wrote Justice
William 0. Douglas "to put on the railroad industry some of the
costs for the legs, eyes, arms, and lives which it consumed in its
operations. Not all these costs were imposed, for the Act did not
make the employer an insurer. The liability which [FELA]
imposed was the liability for negligence."24
FELA expanded the bases for liability by striking common
law defenses like the fellow servant rule, assumption of the risk,
and contributory negligence. It allowed apportionment of liability
based on fault, assigning the duty to the jury. It preserved the
jury system and the requirement that the injured workers prove
that the injury was the fault of another, and it allowed claims to
be brought in local or state court - at the election of the worker.
The FELA reached only railroad workers but it provided the
template for the 1920 Jones Act 25 under which claims have been
made for seamen injured and killed in the Deepwater Horizon
disaster.
Although FELA was the first modern tort reform measure, it
was an anomalous one. The much broader thrust was one that
bypassed the jury system: state workers' compensation laws.
Social reformers and the labor movement, inspired by German
social insurance funds, lobbied in the first two decades of the
twentieth century for state workers' compensation laws. The
second decade of the twentieth century saw the triumph of this
movement in the broad embrace of workers' compensation laws,
which removed workplace injuries from the common law courts
and spared workers from the obstacles of the common law
defenses such as contributory negligence and the fellow servant
23. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2006).
24. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
25. 46 U.S.C. § 30104. This section allows for recovery for injury to or
death of seaman:
A seaman injured in the course of employment or, if the seaman dies
from the injury, the personal representative of the seaman may elect
to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against
the employer. Laws of the United States regulating recovery for
personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an action
under this section.
Id.
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rule.26  The state workers' compensation statutes laws at first
covered only accidental injury. But recognition of occupational
diseases with insidious onset, such as the silicosis that afflicted
the granite cutters of Barre, Vermont, led to a steady and
widespread expansion of coverage to include occupational
diseases. 27 Thus, workers' compensation largely replaced the jury
trial system with a no-fault or strict liability system administered
by administrative law judges. It abolished the defenses of
negligence of a fellow employee, or that the injured employee
assumed the risks inherent in or incidental to or arising out of his
employment, or the failure of the employer to provide and
maintain safe premises and suitable appliances. It modified the
burden of proving proximate cause by use of the phrase "arising
out of and in the course of employment" to describe the requisite
causal link to the employment. 28
Unlike the common law tort system with its lump sum awards
at the conclusion of the litigation, workers compensation systems
assured injured workers of receiving interim wage loss claims
during treatment and recovery for work-related injuries. It
provided a reasonably efficient system of paying for their medical
bills, replacing their wages during the time of their injury, and
finally compensating them for permanent loss (partial or total) of
working ability. Although the adjudication systems are
administrative, not common law, they are generally adversarial
systems with both employer and worker represented by counsel.29
26. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED
WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW
passim (2004).
27. See GEORGE ROZEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 408-415 (1993). See
generally DAVID ROSNER & GERALD MARKOWITZ, DEADLY DUST: SILICOSIS AND
THE POLITICS OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
(1991).
28. See, e.g., Romeo v. Romeo, 418 A.2d 258, 265 (N.J. 1980) ('[I]t is to
be borne in mind that the act we are considering is one of social insurance . . .
designed to place the cost of work-connected injury on the employer who may
readily provide for it as an operating expense.' The fundamental principle
underlying workers' compensation is that of compensating an injured
employee. The statutory scheme was designed '[t]o overcome the harsh
common law rules which often resulted in a denial of recovery to injured
workmen or their dependents where death or injuries occurred from the
work-connected accidents . . . ."') (citations omitted).
29. LEx K. LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 2.08 (1997) (Every
state in the United States has adopted a workers' compensation system, as
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Though workers' compensation is often described as a
tradeoff, because wage replacement was only partial for high-wage
workers, reliable provision of benefits to injured workers was its
overwhelming characteristic. Workers' compensation and Social
Security disability benefits were the major means of sustenance
for the workers sickened by the massive epidemic of asbestos
disease documented by the heroic labors of Dr. Irving Selikoff and
his colleagues. 30  The heedless use of asbestos was finally
stemmed by the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970,31 on the authority of which the United States
Department of Labor quickly banned use of the once ubiquitous
*32
mineral.
In the 1970's, modern mass tort claims arose when a liberal
spirit encouraged third party litigation against asbestos product
manufacturers. 33 Claims were founded on a liability theory first
embraced by the great Republican Judge John Minor Wisdom of
Louisiana in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.34 Though
has the United States); HR Executive Education, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF HUMAN RESOURCES AND LABOR RELATIONS, http://hrlr.msu.edul
hrexecutive education/wcid/wcstate.php (last visited Nov. 12, 2011)
(linking to administrative agency and procedures for each state in the United
States). The federal employees program, allows for attorneys fees but does
not make direct payments to the attorney; however, the conditions are
generally so onerous that attorneys only infrequently represent workers. See
5 U.S.C. § 8127 (2006).
30. See I.J. SELIKOFF. ET AL., Biological Effects of Asbestos, 132 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1 passim (Harold E. Whipple, ed., 1965).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (2006) ("Each employer (1) shall furnish to each of
his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious
physical harm to his employees; (2) shall comply with occupational safety and
health standards promulgated under this Act.").
32. See 40 C.F.R. § 763.167 (2010).
33. See generally George W. Conk, Punctuated Equilibrium: Why Section
402A Flourished and the Third Restatement Languished, 26 REV. LITIG. 799
(2007) (arguing that the 1964 Second Restatement's duty-charged declaration
of liability to the consumer for injury due to product defect even if "the seller
has exercised all possible care" is muted in the defense-inclined 1998
Products Liability Restatement) [hereinafter Punctuated Equilibrium].
34. 493 F.2d 1076, 1105 (5 th Cir. 1974) ("The [sellers] are in the
anomalous position of arguing that (1) the danger was obvious; (2) yet they
issued no semblance of a warning and they posted diluted 'cautions' which
might alert the contractor-purchasers, but not the workers, the final users;
and (3) all admit that they never conducted any tests to determine the extent
of the danger. In their original briefs, on the issue of liability they seem to
DIVING INTO THE WRECK
the court labeled Borel's claim as one in strict liability, review of
the facts recited by the court shows the judgment to be equally
grounded on the demonstrable history of disregard of the health
effects of asbestos, which could support findings of negligence and
recklessness.
As the massive epidemic manifested itself, workers
compensation and third-party tort causes of action arose against
dozens of asbestos-containing product manufacturers and the
companies that used their products. They were handled one by
one, primarily in state workers compensation and trial courts.
Thousands of cases were tried before juries, and thousands were
settled. Delays were substantial due to heavy trial calendars,
legal obstacles, vigorous defense tactics, and then, the insolvency
of many manufacturers, some of which collapsed under the weight
of their liability to injured workers. 35 The force of these claims
pushed relentlessly toward aggregate settlements, rather than the
individual case-by-case resolution, which still characterizes
workers' compensation claims, as well as tort claims for medical
malpractice, and automobile accident injuries. 36
rely primarily on the 'cautions' to the independent contractors, the
purchasers, as if their potential liability ceased to exist before their products
reached the ultimate users. That is not the law. We agree with the
Restatement: a seller may be liable to the ultimate consumer or user for
failure to give adequate warnings. The seller's warning must be reasonably
calculated to reach such persons, and the presence of an intermediate party
will not by itself relieve the seller of this duty.").
35. Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States:
Triumph and Failure of the Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 262,
269-72 (2006); see also Anita Bernstein, Asbestos Achievements, 37 Sw. U. L.
REV. 691, 715 (2008) ("Asbestos liability . .. reveals clients who were retained
and compensated. Antagonists were won over. Claims were strengthened by
aggregation. Settlements were negotiated. Procedural hurdles were
overcome. Evidentiary rules were made more permissive. Statutes of
limitation, the province of legislatures, were revised by judges in a plaintiff-
favoring direction. Hazards were exposed. Large business corporations were
brought to their knees."); Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 576, 582-83 (2008) (reflecting on the process of trying
thousands of asbestos cases).
36. See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of
Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1625-26, 1634 (2004); see also RICHARD A. NAGAREDA,
MAss TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT ix-xx (2007) (suggesting that mass
settlements have transformed the legal system so acutely that rival teams of
lawyers operate as sophisticated governing powers rather than litigators, and
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FOCUSED MASS TORT CLAIMS
Occupational injury and disease cases unfolded in a diffuse
way. But in the past thirty-five years much of the attention has
been on events with a very specific origin. In 1975, the United
States accepted all liability for the adverse health consequences of
the Swine Flu Vaccine campaign, immunizing the manufacturers
of the product, because the government had undertaken a mass
inoculation campaign, which sought, initially, to vaccinate
everyone in the country. 37  In 1986, Congress established the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program." The Act
immunized manufacturers through an administrative mechanism,
which provided medical benefits, compensation for economic loss,
and for pain and suffering. Non-economic losses were capped at
$250,000, which has become an iconic number. The Vaccine Act
preserved a narrow tort option, which the United States Supreme
Court virtually closed in the recent case, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth,39
where it granted vaccine manufacturers the immunity from design
defects that they had long - and unjustly - sought.40 The Court
held that by using the phrase "unavoidable," Congress meant to
foreclose all but failure to warn claims against vaccine
manufacturers. 41
Financed by an excise tax on the mandatory childhood
vaccines, 42 the National Vaccine Injury Program was the first
fund established for the resolution of tort claims.43 Administered
by the United States Department of Health and the United States
Court of Federal Claims, the Vaccine Act is perhaps the most
successful new mechanism for removing from the common law
advocating a private administrative framework to address both current and
future claims).
37. George W. Conk, Will the Post-9/11 World be a Post-Tort World?, 112
PENN ST. L. REV. 175, 236-248 (2007) [hereinafter Post 9/11 World].
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to 300aa-34 (2006).
39. 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011).
40. See id. at 1075; see also George W. Conk, The True Test: Alternative
Safer Designs for Drugs and Medical Devices in a Patent-Constrained Market,
49 UCLA L. REV. 737, 781 (2002).
41. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1075-76.
42. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4131, 9510-11 (2006).
43. The 1976 Swine Flu vaccination campaign gave rise to many claims,
but the vaccine makers were immunized, as the United States agreed to
stand in the shoes of the vaccine manufacturers and defend the "strict
liability" claims. 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b (West, Westlaw through Oct. 2011).
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courts of general jurisdiction tort claims, which, though few, were
prominent because vaccine manufacturers had successfully
demanded they be immunized as the price of agreement to
manufacture the swine flu vaccine. That leverage was again
exercised to remove from the tort system claims like those arising
from live-virus polio vaccine.44 Although it sacrifices the
community judgment element of tort, the childhood vaccine
program provides a tolerably adequate remedy for vaccine-related
injuries for which there is substantial scientific evidence.
But vaccine claims are few and if pursued as product liability
claims, the plaintiffs' prospects were highly uncertain. If lawsuits
had been filed in the tort system, few would have been paid
because product liability law accepts an adequate warning as a
defense to liability.45 The vaccine compensation program is best
understood as a way to encourage citizens to accept the risk of
vaccine-related injury, while relieving the burdens and risks of
tort liability from manufacturers of drugs with generally
irreducible side-effects. Vaccine injury claims, if treated as tort
claims, would not challenge the administrative capabilities of the
common law courts in the way that mass disasters or massive
waves of industrial disease have. In thirty-two years, only 12,937
vaccine-related claims have been filed. Of those, 2845 were
compensated and 7309 dismissed.46 In 2005, adult claims arising
from flu vaccines were added. Although the numbers
compensated are small (only about 150 per year) the program, like
state workers' compensation systems, shows that administrative
mechanisms can satisfactorily provide an alternative to tort
litigation through a sort of statutory strict liability that accepts
certain categories of injuries as compensable without
consideration of fault as a qualifying factor (excluding, of course,
self-inflicted injury).
44. See George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE. L.J. 1087, 1114-1117 (2000).
45. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, cmt. j, k (1965);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PROD. LIAB. §§ 2, 6 (1998).
46. Statistics Report: Claims Filed and Compensated or Dismissed by
Vaccine, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RES. (Nov. 3, 2011),
http://www.hrsa.gov/ vaccinecompensation/statisticsreports.html#Claims.
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VIoxx: GLOBAL SSETTLEMENT AFTER CASE MANAGEMENT AND
BELLWETHER TRIALS
In the past twenty-five years, some of the most difficult mass
tort claims have been associated with heedless mass marketing of
little-studied drugs47 like the diet drug fen-phen, 48 Zyprexa, 49 and
Vioxx.50  In those cases, thousands of events were aggregated
through litigation, thrusting thousands of litigants into an
unexpected and complex group dynamic, which tested the outside
limits of the individual claim model of tort litigation.51 Courts
responded with consolidation techniques like the federal MDL
panels and state mass tort courts. The result was the now
familiar pattern of case management, consolidated discovery,
bellwether trials, and settlement grids. 52 Despite the formation of
47. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADEMIES, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY,
17 (2006) ("The Committee on the Assessment of the U.S. Drug Safety
System believes that as more drugs are being approved faster with less time
to intensively investigate premarketing safety data, FDA does not have
adequate resources or procedures for translating preapproval safety signals
into effective postmarketing studies, for monitoring and ascertaining the
safety of new marketed drugs, for responding promptly to the safety problems
that are discovered after marketing approval, and for quickly and effectively
communicating appropriate risk information to the public.").
48. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs, Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (approving class action settlement and
establishment of settlement trust for resolution of thousands of injury
claims).
49. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-01596, 2005
WL 3117302 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2005) (approving Final Settlement Protocol
for Zyprexa claims).
50. See generally SNIGDHA PRAKASH, ALL THE JUSTICE MONEY CAN BUY:
CORPORATE GREED ON TRIAL (2011) (viewing the Vioxx Litigation and
Settlement through the lens of a single trial); Punctuated Equilibrium, supra
note 33, at 861-869 (surveying weaknesses of FDA regulation in light of Vioxx
experience).
51. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1,
2-6 (2009); see also Ed Silverman, Merck, Vioxx & The Legal System: Snigdha
Explains, PHARMALOT (June 9, 2011, 7:52 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/
2011/06/merck-vioxx-and-the-legal-system-snigdha-explains/ (commentary by
NPR reporter Snigdha Prakash who was embedded with plaintiffs' lawyers in
a key Vioxx trial); Ed Silverman, Law Prof on Vioxx Deal: A Good Gamble for
Merck, PHARMALOT (Nov. 9, 2007, 1:52 PM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2007/
11/legal-expert-on-vioxx-deal-a-good-gamble-for-merck (commentary by law
professor Benjamin Zipursky).
52. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 2326-2330; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
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judicially administered ad hoc litigation-management
bureaucracies laden with lawyers, through selected bellwether
trials juries have continued to provide an important measure of
community judgment of the conduct of claimants and defendants
in such mass tort pharmaceutical product liability cases.
But the pressures toward aggregation are enormous. Mass
marketing done heedlessly yields mass litigation. Thus it was
with the anti-inflammatory medicine Vioxx that was approved for
marketing by the FDA in April 1999. The mass marketing
campaign was very successful (sales reached two billion dollars
per year). But anecdotal reports of heart attacks among users
turned into a tsunami of epidemiological reports and meta-
analyses dissecting the risk factors and results among Merck's
millions of arthritic customers. Merck announced a "try every
case" strategy. Merck's lawyers focused on the difficulties of proof
of causation in each individual case - the drug's users were, after
all, an older, arthritic, and therefore sedentary group. Merck's
defense otherwise mirrored its aggressive sales strategy: its drug
was good, there was some slight risk after eighteen months of use,
we studied the drug's uses carefully, and prudentially withdrew it
from the market. 53
But the evidence showed that its marketing-led
pharmaceutical division had downplayed dramatic evidence of
health risks, concealed data from a medical journal and the FDA,
and had tenaciously - and largely successfully - fought every
effort by the FDA to warn patients of the growing evidence of
elevated risk of heart attacks and strokes. 54 The result was a
record at trial of two-thirds won by Merck (twelve out of
eighteen).s Most defense victories were on individual causation.
There were four punitive damages awards and five major awards
LITIGATION, supra note 2; see also Lahav, supra note 35, at 637-38 (describing
the history of bellwether trials and finding they result in rough justice).
53. See generally, PRAKASH, supra note 48.
54. See e.g., McDarby v. Merck, 949 A.2d 223, 229, 243-44 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2008) (holding that a jury could reasonably conclude that
market pressures led Merck to unreasonably and successfully resist FDA
pressures to warn of cardiac risks of anti-arthritic drug Vioxx).
55. This figure was derived from a survey of plaintiffs' lawyers in Vioxx
cases conducted by this author; see also Alexandra D. Lahav, Vioxx Verdicts,
MAss TORT LITIGATION BLOG (October 29, 2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad
.com/masstortjlitigation/2009/10/vioxx-verdicts-.html.
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of compensatory damages, three awards of consumer fraud
damages and attorneys' fees. With defense costs approaching
$200 million per year and thousands of cases in the hopper - each
theoretically entitled to a trial by jury - Merck finally conceded
and offered $4.85 billion for a global settlement. 56
The Vioxx litigation and settlement is an exemplar of
successful consolidated case management. 57  After the $4.85
billion settlement was announced in November 2007, as of
February 29, 2008, more than 44,000 of 47,000 eligible claimants
had enrolled in the program. 58 That constitutes over ninety-three
percent of all eligible claimants. In order for Merck's offer to vest,
plaintiffs' lawyers had to recommend the settlement to every
client and achieve acceptance by eighty-five percent of those who
claimed they had suffered a heart attack or stroke over twelve
months usage of Vioxx. 59 If a client rejected the recommendation
the lawyer was bound to withdraw from further representation.
The phrase "offer that cannot be refused" comes to mind. Indeed
the Vioxx settlement has been sharply criticized for granting so
much leverage to the lawyers who struck the bargain that client
consent was improperly compromised.o
A special challenge to the plaintiffs' lawyers was the eighty-
five percent acceptance threshold. That necessity - and the
promise to recommend the settlement to every client - compelled
aspects of the settlement that underlie the BP/Feinberg strategy:
56. David Voreacos & Allen Johnson, Merck Paid 3,468 Death Claims to
Resolve Vioxx Suits, BLOOMBERG (July 27, 2010 5:27 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-27/merck-paid-3-468-death-claims-
to-resolve-vioxx-suits.html; see also Settlement Agreement between Merck &
Co. and Plaintiffs' Counsel (Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://www.scribd.com/
doc/60282334/Vioxx-Final-agreement-signed.
57. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Rough Justice, 2, 36-41 (March 2, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562677
(surveying mass settlements in Vioxx and other cases and concluding that
rough justice is not only efficient, but fair).
58. See OFFICIAL VIOXX SETTLEMENT, http://www.officialvioxx
settlement.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (website of the Vioxx MDL
Plaintiffs Steering Committee).
59. Id.
60. See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus
Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 265, 320-21 (2011) (arguing that mass tort
settlements such as that in Vioxx cases place excessive power in the hands of
lawyers, and that such mechanisms, which empower plaintiffs' lawyers to
deliver closure, downplay the importance of client consent).
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even weak claims have value. In order for the plaintiffs' lawyers
to be able in good faith to recommend the settlement to every
client there had to be something in it for everyone. One cannot
get a release in exchange for nothing. In the Vioxx settlement
even short-term users were entitled to an award from the
settlement fund. The Vioxx settlement fund, it is important to
note, reflected the experience of the eighteen trials. Although
extrapolating lessons from a relatively small base is a challenge to
statisticians, it is less of a challenge to trial lawyers. The lawyers
work from a larger base of information. The actual experience of
trial, and of preparation for trial, concentrates the mind. The
settlement therefore established a point system which took into
account the length of use, the total dose, the severity of the heart
attack or stroke, and then discounted for risk factors: diabetes,
tobacco smoking history, alcohol abuse, and certain illegal drug
use. Even a single cigarette smoked after a heart attack reduced
the value of a claimant's settlement amount by fifty percent, not
because any of the trials had shown it, but because both plaintiffs'
and defense's lawyers believed that risk-takers were unlikely to
-61prevail at trial.
The success of the plaintiffs' lawyers in selling the global
settlement to their clients has many causes. But high among
them is the experience of the bellwether trials. Through that
experience, counsel for both plaintiffs and defendants learned
something of their strengths and weaknesses. Their clients saw
that the cases had been presented and tested vigorously, and that
they were met with explainable success and failure. The
settlement offers therefore (even though a dollar figure could only
be guessed at by the client) were recommended by someone whose
credibility was high, having been earned on the field of battle, as
it were. And the judgments were not those of someone on the
payroll of lawyers or of Merck. They reflected the judgments of an
undeniably independent group: the eighteen civil juries who
actually deliberated and delivered their verdicts. It was, thus, the
jury verdicts that were the ultimate guarantor of the legitimacy of
the settlement.
61. See, e.g., OFFICIAL VIoxx SETTLEMENT CALCULATOR,
http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com (last visited Sept. 26, 2011).
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9/11 VICTIMS COMPENSATION FUND: SECRETS OF ITS SUCCESS
The next example of successful global settlement is the
September 11, 2001 Victims Compensation Fund, of which
Kenneth Feinberg served as Special Master. The success of that
project boosted Feinberg to iconic status as a Solomon among
lawyers, a compassionate judge, a sort of Walter Cronkite
swimming among the sharks. The reputation was well-earned.62
Congress responded to the entreaties of the airlines in the
days after the catastrophe. The air carriers were insured for
negligence verdicts involving passenger deaths, but were utterly
unprepared for the deaths of the victims on the ground. That
there would be evidence of negligence, of sleeping at the switch, no
one doubted. The airline manufacturers and airlines had
reflexively resisted regulators who sought to require hardened
cockpits for fear an airplane would be hijacked by terrorists. As
one historian observed, "[I]n the face of a clear warning, alert
measures bowed to routine."63 Congress responded with the Air
Transportation System Stabilization and Safety Act. 64
The third "S" is a sop. It was system stabilization that drove
the Congress to authorize the Attorney General to name one
person who would, without budgetary limit, achieve a global
settlement, which would save the airlines and our national
passenger airplane manufacturer, Boeing, from insolvency. That
person, as we all know, was Kenneth Feinberg. He achieved
nearly complete acceptance of his offers of settlement, and he did
it without interference from the courts, without trials by jury, in
an administrative process that proceeded parallel to the multi-
district litigation managed by Judge Alvin Hellerstein (another
Solomonic sort) in the federal district court in lower Manhattan.
As time went on and Feinberg got signatures on bottom lines, the
62. Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims
Facility as a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims - A Fund Too Far, 71 LA.
L. REv. 819, 820 (2011) ("The appearance of Feinberg as the heroic savior in
the Gulf oil calamity was, in no small measure, a consequence of a persona
whose reputation has indeed assumed mythic proportions in the public
consciousness."); see also Post 9/11 World, supra note 37, at 182-88.
63. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMIssION REPORT 344 (2004), available at http://www.p-
1 lcommission.gov/report/91 lreport.pdf.
64. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-40129 (2006); Post 9/11 World, supra note
37, at 182.
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numbers of plaintiffs on Hellerstein's 9/11 catastrophe docket
dwindled.65
When making settlement offers, the statute directed the
Special Master to consider:
(i) the extent of the harm to the claimant, including any
economic and non-economic losses; and (ii) the amount of
compensation to which the claimant is entitled based on
the harm to the claimant, the facts of the claim, and the
individual circumstances of the claimant. 66
Feinberg faced formidable obstacles in designing a scheme of
compensation for the 9/11 victims. Although the national treasury
was his for the purpose, Congress had constrained Feinberg in
certain respects: he was required to make individually tailored
awards and deduct from each anything received from a collateral
source, which Congress defined broadly to include life insurance,
pension funds, death benefit programs, and payments by Federal,
State, or local governments. Feinberg, as Special Master, was a
one-man federal administrative agency. 67  He interpreted the
statute very loosely, concluding that "all" life insurance proceeds
65. The final wrongful death lawsuit settled on Monday, September 19,
2011. Benjamin Weiser, Family and United Airlines Settle Last 9/11
Wrongful Death Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2011, at A29, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/ nyregion/last-911-wrongful-death-suit-
is-settled.html? r=2.
66. See Henry Cohen, The September 11 Victim Compensation Fund of
2001, in Focus ON TERRORISM, VOLUME 2 at 41 (Edward V. Liden ed., 2002)
(describing the compensation fund established by the Air Transportation
System Stabilization and Safety Act) (citation omitted).
67. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Problematic Structure of the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 527, 544
(2003) ("[Tlhere is no constraint on awards under the September 11th Fund.
Its budget is unlimited, and its definitional principles vague."); see also
Matthew Diller, Tort and Social Welfare Principles in the Victim
Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 725-726 (2003) (arguing that
the 9/11 Fund is not a true fund, but a public benefit program with a private
law gloss: "[T]he scheme falls short in one of the main goals of a procedural
system - convincing participants that they should accept the outcome
because their claims have been determined through the dispassionate
application of general principles to their particular circumstances. In both
the substantive standards and the procedural model, the spotlight remains
focused on the personal choices and values of Special Master Feinberg
himself. Regardless of how capable and well-intentioned the Special Master,
the Fund vests too much discretion in a single individual with little means of
accountability and oversight.").
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did not include the cash value that employee contributions
represented in the life insurance policy benefits.
Death claims accounted for $5.99 billion of the $7 billion total
claims paid.6 8  Forty-three percent of that went to claimants
whose deceased victims earned under $100,000.69 Over thirty
percent went to families who had incomes in excess of $200,000.70
The awards highlighted the distribution of wealth and income in
our society and led to recriminations by some who asked why they,
whose husband or father, son, or daughter "died a hero," should
receive a lesser award than a hedge fund trader's family.
Feinberg set the top presumed economic loss at the 98th
percentile of household income ($231,000), which actually
significantly lowered many awards.7  But the presumed awards
were not true caps - each claimant was afforded the opportunity
to be heard on whether there should be a deviation from the
presumed norm Feinberg had established.72
Kenneth Feinberg's ninety-seven percent success rate
established him as the master of the global settlement. 73 Working
with virtually complete autonomy he had resolved the 9/11 claims
through the flexibility shown in his willingness to relax statutory
provisions, meet with claimants face-to-face, and set flexible,
little-specified norms in order to accomplish both distributional
equity and complete closure.
Feinberg's now peerless prestige as healer/lawyer who had
served the nation pro bono, brought his next high profile public
service appointment - by President Obama as the (nearly
powerless) "payroll czar" for companies receiving Troubled Asset
Relief Program "bailout" subsidies after the financial crisis of
2008.
68. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER,
SEPTEMBER 11 VIcTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, VOLUME I, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE 106 (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/
final report.pdf.
69. Id. at 103.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 8.
72. Id. at 13.
73. See id. at 1.
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THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON CATASTROPHE:
GCCF - THE PSEUDO-FUND MODEL
When on April 20, 2010 the Deepwater Horizon rig burned
and the largest oil spill in history began, BP was designated a
"responsible party" by the Coast Guard under the OPA.74 BP's
statutory obligations ranged from cleanup to interim and final
payments to those who suffered losses due to the spill. The
country was transfixed and BP was in its sights. While oil still
flowed from the blowout well, BP announced that it would commit
twenty billion dollars to meeting its statutory obligations under
the OPA. When the spill erupted BP soon saw the value in the
brand-name Feinberg had developed. BP decided to hire Kenneth
Feinberg to administer its compensation plan. President Obama
concurred in BP's decision to hire Feinberg to carry out its duties
as a "responsible party" under the OPA. BP's appointment of
Feinberg was said by the White House to be a guarantee of
independence.
With that decision BP signaled its intention to seek a global
solution to claims arising from the still untamed spill. Feinberg
would be the independent claims administrator. 76  But unlike
74. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2720 (2006).
75. The White House blog reported that "[a] new, independent claims
process will be created with the mandate to be fairer, faster, and more
transparent in paying damage claims by individuals and businesses," with
the following features:
To assure independence, Kenneth Feinberg, who previously
administered the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, will
serve as the independent claims administrator[;] [t]he facility will
develop standards for recoverable claims that will be published[;] [a]
panel of three judges will be available to hear appeals of the
administrator's decisions[; and] [tihe facility is designed for claims of
individuals and businesses who have been harmed by the oil spill;
local, state, tribal, and federal government claims will continue to be
handled directly by BP.
Jesse Lee, A New Process and a New Escrow Account for Gulf Oil Spill
Claims from BP, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Jun. 17, 2010, 2:35 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ blog/2010/06?page=3; see also Katelyn Sabochik,
The President's Meeting with BP Executives: 'An Important Step Towards
Making the People of the Gulf Coast Whole Again", THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG
(Jun. 16, 2010, 3:51 PM), http://www.whitehouse.govfblog/2010/06?page=3.
76. Mullenix, supra note 62, at 819-820. Mullenix described BP's
decision to hire Feinberg as an act in a morality play:
In the morality play of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, BP assumed
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special masters appointed by courts or legislators, Feinberg's
operation - the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF) answers only
to BP, which was obligated to answer to the nation under the
OPA, which imposed strict liability for the spill's consequences.
Funds have been (or will be at the anticipated rate of five
billion dollars per year) transferred to bank accounts owned by BP
and announcements made on what has been paid, but there is no
"fund" if what one means by a fund is an entity with meaningful
juridical independence, such as a trust fund. Here the obligations
remain BP's and any funds that remain at the close will revert to
BP.77
Although the "Gulf Coast Claims Facility" that Kenneth
Feinberg operates is commonly referred to as a "fund" there is in
fact nothing to make that so. There is no escrow, no supervision,
no accounting, no independent review, no regulatory oversight, no
regulations with which the GCCF must comply. There is only the
commitment to "pay all legitimate claims" - a meaningless
statement since the company, designated as a "responsible party"
under the OPA, is legally obligated to pay all legitimate claims.
Only if BP defaults on its obligations will the Coast Guard-
administered Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund come into play to pay
for "uncompensated" damages and clean-up costs. 78 So long as BP
is paying claims it operates free of government supervision.
The OPA establishes strict liability for oil pollution. A party
designated by the Coast Guard as "responsible" can claim the
benefit of a seventy-five million dollar cap, unless there have been
the Promethean role of modern energy-bringer to mankind. In its
arrogance for attempting to expropriate energy from miles below the
ocean floor and bring oil to mankind, BP precipitated a massive
calamity. As a consequence, BP faced the eternal punishment of
being lashed to the American Caucasus of never-ending civil
litigation, perpetually to be pecked away by claimants. Rather than
endure this interminable retribution, BP instead chose to terminate
its own agony as quickly as possible by creating a fund. And,
Hercules - in the form of the heroic Ken Feinberg - appeared to BP
just in time to slay the civil litigators and liberate BP. For his efforts
at enabling the BP rescue, BP rewarded Feinberg.
Id.
77. See Sabochik, supra note 75; see also Claims Information, BP,
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9036580&contentId=
7067577 (last visited September 24, 2011).
78. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2713(e), 2714 (2006); 33 C.F.R. §§ 138.10-138.240
(2011).
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violations of regulatory requirements or reckless conduct, in which
case the cap is lifted. BP waived the statutory cap defense while
denying that it had been reckless. 79
It was clear from the beginning then that BP had to establish
a substantial claims adjusting bureaucracy to administer the flood
of claims sure to emerge. Like workers compensation systems,
and unlike ordinary common law tort actions, the OPA mandates
interim payments:
The responsible party shall establish a procedure for the
payment or settlement of claims for interim, short-term
damages. Payment or settlement of a claim for interim,
short-term damages representing less than the full
amount of damages to which the claimant ultimately may
be entitled shall not preclude recovery by the claimant for
damages not reflected in the paid or settled partial
claim. 80
The nature and extent of the claims to be recognized are
dictated by the OPA, which provides for payment of: "(d)amages
equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due
to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal
property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any
claimant." 1 BP had to decide if it would administer the claims
process itself or hand the management of it over to someone else.
BP opted for outsourcing the job. Feinberg's firm Feinberg Rozen,
LLP took on that job.
Although the Gulf Oil Spill claims arise from a single event
caused, in part, by regulatory failure and industrial malpractice,
and the claims were principally going to be for economic losses, BP
faced substantial uncertainty regarding how far liability would
extend. The OPA's reference to losses suffered due to loss or
destruction of a "natural resource" or that "results from" an oil
spill is an invitation to a maze. Claims differ in the directness of
79. Statement of BP Exploration & Production Inc. re Applicability of
Limit of Liability under Oil Pollution Act of 1990 at 1-2, In re Oil Spill by the
Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL
No. 2179, (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2010), ECF No. 559, available at
http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/ OilSpill/Orders/BPStatement.pdf.
80. 33 U.S.C. § 2705 (2006).
81. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (2006).
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their causal relationship to the event. Historically judges have
been reluctant to extend the reach of tort liability beyond those
who suffered personal injury or property damage. But courts had
made an exception for fishermen. Even though they did not own
the fish affected by a spill, their rights to the lost catch had often
been recognized by courts. 82
But identifying who in litigation decides the limits of liability
is far more complex and uncertain. Courts have oscillated
between either assigning the issue to the jury as a fact question or
deciding the issue themselves by declaring the limits of liability to
be a duty or legal question to be decided by the judge. 83  Such
questions abound in the first year curriculum of American law
schools as fuel spills, careening barges, falling lumber, unexpected
explosions, and their consequences yield a flood of metaphors
about directness, proximity, foreseeability and the like.
By issuing only oracular protocols and guidelines Kenneth
Feinberg has kept vague the line-drawing process, maximizing his
own discretion. For example, he explained in an October 2010
press release:
"I have heard from elected officials in Florida, including
Governor Crist, Attorney General McCollum, CFO Sink
and others, about their concerns regarding Floridians'
proximity to the spill and how, regardless of distance,
there has been economic impact beyond the areas closest
to the spill. After listening to these concerns, I have
concluded that a geographic test to determine eligibility
regarding economic harm due to the oil spill is
unwarranted." Feinberg continues to review each claim
on a case-by-case basis and claimants must prove
damages resulting from the spill itself and not other
causes, but "physical proximity from the spill will not, in
and of itself, bar the processing of legitimate claims," he
82. See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MV Testabank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1021-
28 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (surveying origin and exceptions to the "economic
loss rule," the doctrine that no recovery in tort is permitted absent damage to
the property or person of the victim).
83. W. Jonathan Cardi, The Hidden Legacy of Palsgraf: Modern Duty
Law in Microcosm, B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstractid=1851316.
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This case-by-case vagueness concentrates knowledge and
discretion in Feinberg's hands, unbounded by regulatory, judicial,
or jury supervision. Because he is dispensing the statutorily
obligated interim payments, a process which government neither
regulates nor reviews, it is impossible to know with any certainty
where he is drawing the line. And the same will hold true for
"final" payments, which are conditioned on general release of
claims, not only in favor of BP, but a whole raft of unspecified BP-
affiliated entities.8 5
In establishing the GCCF and giving Feinberg an apparently
free hand to accomplish the company's objectives, and meet its
statutory obligations, BP had to ask itself, would courts, as they
had in the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska, refuse to compensate
others who make their living from the sea, like the wholesalers,
processors, cannery employees, and tenderers who had been
thrown out of court?86 Would the charterers, fishing guides, boat
renters, and shoreline hotels, whose businesses suffered, be
denied as they had been in Alaska? Or would the courts embrace
the dissent by the great Louisiana Judge John Minor Wisdom, of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in New
Orleans? In 1985, Wisdom had declared by dissent in Louisiana
ex re. Guste v. M/V Testabank that compensation for a maritime
tort should extend to all who "make use of the sea."87 On the Gulf
Coast that describes a lot of people.
BP hoped to avoid the uncertainty of judges and juries by its
bold move to hire Feinberg, grant him substantial settlement
authority and a twenty billion dollar commitment, a sum plausibly
sufficient to satisfy the claims that are overwhelmingly for
economic loss, though wrongful death and personal injury claims
84. Press release, Gulf Coast Claims Facility, Feinberg Announces
Clarification Regarding Geographic Proximity (Oct. 4, 2010),
http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/press7.php.
85. GULF COAST CLAIMs FACILITY, SAMPLE RELEASE AND COVENANT NOT
TO SUE, 2, 4-5, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/sample-release.pdf
(last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
86. See In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1994 U.S. Dist LEXIS
20555, at *7 (D. Ala. Jan. 26, 1994).
87. Louisiana ex rel. Guste, 752 F.2d at 1044 n.23 (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting).
2012] 161
162 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:137
are also within the GCCF's scope. The fund will also be depleted
by clean-up costs incurred by federal and state governments.
In February 2011, Feinberg released his "final methodology,"
in which each claim would be "reviewed and evaluated on its own
merits and specific circumstances." The authority asserted has
the aura of an official proclamation8 8 :
The Gulf Coast Claims Facility ("GCCF") hereby
announces its Final Rules Governing Payment Options,
Eligibility and Substantiation Criteria, and Final
Payment Methodology ("Final Rules"). The GCCF is
acting for and on behalf of BP in fulfilling its statutory
obligations as a "responsible party" under the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990. All claimants have the right to
consult with an attorney of their own choosing prior to
accepting any settlement or signing a release of legal
right. 89
Feinberg has been exercising this broad settlement authority
within the scope of the OPA and general tort law in exchange for
an initial $850,000 per month flat fee, now increased to $1,250,000
per month. Feinberg has devoted the efforts of his law firm, his
judgment, and deployed his considerable reputation to successful
management of the massive undertaking of overseeing BP's
claims-processing centers. 90 In March 2011, Feinberg announced
88. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of
Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10497, at
*23-25 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011) (ordering that Feinberg represent himself as
an agent of BP).
89. GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, FINAL RULES GOVERNING PAYMENT
OPTIONS, ELIGIBILITY AND SUBSTANTIATION CRITERIA, AND FINAL PAYMENT
METHODOLOGY 1, 4 (2011), available at http://www.gulfcoastelaims
facility.com/FINALRULES.pdf.
90. A March 22, 2011 memorandum to Feinberg Rozen by former
Attorney General Michael Mukasey recites the scope of the BP claims
operation and declares reasonable the fees charged by the firm. See
Memorandum from Michael B. Mukasey to Kenneth R. Feinberg, 1-8 (Oct. 7,
2010), available at http://motherjones.com/ files/gulf coastclaimsjfacility
feinberg-rozenllps-compensation October8_201011.pdf. This is an odd
document in that it does not cite any authority for determining the
reasonableness of the fees. See id. Notably it does not cite the criteria of Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.5, though it addresses the rule's concerns. See id.
The omission is presumably in aid of Feinberg's insistence that he does not
have an attorney-client relationship with BP and is not its agent.
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that:
"Since the end of the Emergency Payment period on
November 23, 2010, the GCCF has received
approximately 256,000 individual and business claims
seeking Final Payments, Interim Payments or Quick
Payments." The GCCF had processed 138,874 (54.2%) of
these claims.91
Employing the same liberal claims settlement stance he
wielded with great skill in the 9/11 Fund, Feinberg has preserved
for himself a good deal of flexibility regarding what claims he is
going to recognize. There are no OPA enforcement regulations of
any use. Those adopted in 1992 for interim claims to the Oils Spill
Liability Trust Fund say only that one need not own the damaged
asset and the loss must be a result of the spill.92 To assist him in
this task, Feinberg elicited a report from Harvard torts professor
John Goldberg on liability for economic loss in connection with the
BP oil spill. 93 In that report, Goldberg emphasized the causal
terms "results from" and "due to," which give Feinberg a great
deal of flexibility under the OPA. Although the United States
Department of Justice has complained that Feinberg is using an
unreasonably restrictive "direct cause" standard rather than a
"results from" standard, any distinction between the two is
obscure. The fishermen are the easy case, but other shoreline
businesses have more attenuated relationships to the sea, and
maritime tort is generally the guiding source when, as here, a
vessel sinks. Feinberg has shown in his "final protocol" an
91. Press Release, Gulf Coast Claims Facility, Gulf Coast Claims
Facility Announces an Important Milestone: Over Half of All Interim and
Final Claims Submitted to the GCCF Have Been Processed (Mar. 14, 2011),
available at http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/pressl8.php [hereinafter
Gulf Coast Claims Facility Announces an Important Milestone].
92. See 33 U.S.C. § 2713 (2006) (providing that one can bring a lawsuit if
a claim is denied or not paid within 90 days, and may present a claim to the
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund if "full and adequate compensation is
unavailable" as might occur in case of insolvency or if the applicable spill
liability cap has been reached); see also 33 C.F.R. §§ 136.1-136.313 (2010)
(setting forth procedures for claims to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund).
93. See Memorandum from John C. P. Goldberg, Professor of Law,
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intention to permit claims well beyond those of the fishermen who,
along with owners of damaged property, were the sole
beneficiaries of private claims in the Exxon Valdez spill. He has
indicated a willingness to compensate businesses dependent on
tourism if they can show cancellations or other solid evidence
linking lost revenue to the spill. 94
FUTURE Loss CLAIMS
The causal relationship and estimation of future losses is a
difficult proposition. Catch landings are reported to have been
high for the latter part of 2010, when the fisheries were reopened,
according to a report by a Texas A&M scientist. Feinberg has
offered final settlements to fishermen of double their
demonstrated 2010 loss. The report estimated certain fisheries
will recover by 2012.95
Feinberg therefore has estimated - with evidence that would
ordinarily not be admissible because it is excessively speculative -
that the fisheries will be at thirty percent of normal in 2011, at
seventy percent of normal in 2012, and 100 percent of normal the
year after that. He has therefore offered double the 2010 loss in
exchange for a general release in favor of BP.
In comments posted online by the GCCF (with identifiers
redacted) BP protested Feinberg's alleged generosity. But its
continued retention of Feinberg and his firm indicates a
recognition that if defendants want to settle early, they must
settle on the high side.
Feinberg and his law firm took over management of a massive
effort. As of March 19, 2011, the thirty GCCF offices had received
828,225 claims, the bulk of them for emergency assistance and
other interim claims. The services rendered by Feinberg Rozen for
BP's "Gulf Coast Claims Facility" have been broad in scope. The
firm undertook, pursuant to its contract with BP, claim intake,
94. See, e.g., GULF COAST CLAIMs FACILITY, FINAL RULES GOVERNING
PAYMENT OPTIONS, ELIGIBILITY AND SUBSTANTIATION CRITERIA, AND FINAL
PAYMENT METHODOLOGY, ATTACHMENT D 1 (2011), available at
http://www.gulfcoast claimsfacility.com/FINALRULESD.pdf.
95. JOHN W. TUNNELL JR., AN EXPERT OPINION OF WHEN THE GULF OF
MEXIco WILL RETURN TO PRE-SPILL STATUS FOLLOWING THE BP DEEPWATER
HORIZON MC 252 OIL SPILL 25-26, 36 (2011), available at
http://www.gulfcoastclaims facility.com/exhibit-d.pdf.
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review, evaluation, settlement, and payment services, and "[cilaim
administration services including maintenance of appropriate
databases and information technology systems therefor." The
GCCF has done that work and has processed a huge number of
claims. As of March 11, 2011, total payments were said to be
approximately one billion dollars.
KENNETH FEINBERG - AGENT OF BP
The BP Feinberg Agreement 96 and the establishment of the
Gulf Coast Claims Facility as BP's statutorily-required process for
satisfying damage and clean-up claims were plainly inspired by
the hope of a global settlement or something approaching it. The
company sought to trade on Feinberg's reputation for
independence to enhance its chances of resolving claims
efficiently, and Feinberg stubbornly insisted that he was
independent, not an agent and not an attorney for BP.
Unfortunately, as we shall see, those representations of
independence were misleading and were repudiated by the United
States District Judge overseeing the parallel MDL.
Kenneth Feinberg presented himself in a mode similar to the
way Justice Louis Brandeis famously described himself when
confronted at his confirmation hearing with the welter of interest
conflicts in his law practice: he was the 'lawyer for the situation,'
he said brushing off the conflict of interest dust on his suit. 97 But
such a breezy escape was not available for Feinberg. For the BP
Gulf oil spill Kenneth Feinberg is not an "administrator,"
representing the public, as he was for the September 11 Fund.
The facts show that he is a lawyer for BP who has been given
substantial settlement authority, though his authority is limited
to obtaining voluntary settlements and he does not represent BP
in court or before any governmental agencies. Such contractual
96. See Agreement attached as Exhibit A to BP's Memorandum in
Opposition to "Plaintiffs' Motion to Supervise Ex Parte Communications
Between BP Defendants and Putative Class Members," In re Oil Spill by the
Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL
No. 2179 (E.D. La. Jan. 10, 2011) ECF No. 963, available at
http://www.scribd.comldoc/47227618/Agreement-BP-and-Kenneth-Feinberg-
law-firm [hereinafter Agreement between BP Exploration and Production
Inc. and Feinberg Rozen, LLP].
97. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer for the Situation, 39 VAL. U.L. REV.
377, 377 (2004).
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limitations of a lawyer's services are contemplated by the
disciplinary rules. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(c)
provides that "[a] lawyer may limit the scope of the representation
if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the
client gives informed consent."98 In the preamble to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, the American Bar Association
describes the work of lawyers. Feinberg and his law firm, working
for BP, play every role listed save that of advocate:
As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various
functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an
informed understanding of the client's legal rights and
obligations and explains their practical implications. As
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position
under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a
lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but
consistent with requirements of honest dealings with
others. As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a
client's legal affairs and reporting about them to the
client or to others. 99
Settlement of claims, and justification of those settlements to
the client, requires Feinberg to negotiate and evaluate claims, and
to advise BP of the bases for the settlements reached on liability
and damages, which, by Agreement, must comport with the
OPA. 00 All these contracted functions are those of a lawyer.
That BP could have contracted with a non-lawyer third party
administrator to provide such services does not change the fact
that it chose to hire a law firm (Feinberg Rozen) to oversee the
process. By doing so BP availed itself of the lawyer's duties of
confidentiality (Rule 1.6), loyalty (Rule 1.7) competence (Rule 1.1),
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2009).
99. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble 2 (2009) (emphasis
added).
100. This is particularly plain as to settlements especially at or above the
500,000 dollar threshold and as to the settlement of the wrongful death and
personal injury claims, which arise under maritime law, not the OPA, in
which case the BP-Feinberg Rozen Agreement provides for appeal by BP to a
panel of arbitrators, and in settlement of the wrongful death and personal
injury claims which arise under maritime law, not the OPA. See Gulf Coast
Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, GULF COAST CLAIMS
FACILITY (February, 8, 2011), http://www.gulfcoastclaims facility.com/proto_4
(last visited Sept. 23, 2010).
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diligence (Rule 1.3), and communication "to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation" (Rule 1.4), such as whether the law
firm is exercising its settlement authority within the agreed
scope.101
As administrator, Feinberg reported that as of March 14,
2011,102 the GCCF had received "256,000 individual and business
claims seeking Final Payments, Interim Payments or Quick
Payments.103 The GCCF has processed 138,874 (54.2%) of these
claims. 104 That work certainly involved much work as evaluator
and negotiator - seeking "result[s] advantageous to the client but
consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others," as
the ABA Preamble puts it.
101. These references are to the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct,
which in all material respects here relevant are identical to the ABA's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1-
1.7 (2009); see also LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1-1.7 (2011), available
at http://www.ladb.org/Publications/ropc.pdf.
102. Gulf Coast Claims Facility Announces an Important Milestone,
supra note 91.
103. Id. Interim payments are made without prejudice to future damage
claims. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, FINAL RULE GOVERNING PAYMENT
OPTIONS, ELIGIBILITY AND SUBSTANTIATION CRITERIA, AND FINAL PAYMENT
METHODOLOGY, supra note 89, at 2. Quick Payments are final and include a
general release. See id.
104. The Gulf Coast Claims Facility reports that
Some of the key statistics are as follows: . . . 99,905 Quick Payments
($5,000 for an individual; $25,000 for business). . . . In less than one
month since the February 18, 2011 formal announcement of the
GCCF Final Rules, the GCCF has made Final Payment offers to
18,562 claimants totaling $174,018,282.00; 6,632 claimants have
accepted these Final Payment offers totaling $66,612,269.00. The
remaining claimants have 90 days from the date of their Final
Payment offer to make a decision. . . . In less than one month since
the announcement of the Final Rules, 2,763 claimants were paid
Interim Payments totaling $36,976,875.00. . . . In less than one
month since the announcement of the Final Rules, 19,413 claimants
have received a deficiency letter requesting additional information,
informing the claimant that the submission of inadequate
documentation prevents the accelerated processing of their claims...
. 2,277 claimants received notification that their reviewed claim
resulted in a "0" loss determination. . . . 3,100 claims have been
officially denied. . . . 117,889 claims (46%) remain to be processed by
the GCCF (hundreds of claims continue to be filed on a daily basis).
Gulf Coast Claims Facility Announces an Important Milestone, supra note
91.
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James Caldwell, the Louisiana Attorney General, who had
reviewed the November 10, 2010 "Protocol for Interim and Final
Claims," promptly complained, citing the "public perception of
your role as an attorney for BP." 05 He demanded that Feinberg
"secure approval" for the Protocol from the State's Office of
Disciplinary Counsel. Feinberg insisted that he was neither agent
nor attorney for BP, hiring legal ethics specialist Stephen Gillers
of NYU Law School who penned a letter proclaiming Feinberg to
be "independent" and endorsing the proposition that Feinberg is
neither an agent of BP nor in an attorney-client relationship with
BP:
You are not in an attorney-client relationship with BP.
You are an independent administrator and owe none of
the attributes of the attorney-client relationship (e.g.,
loyalty, confidentiality) to BP. By "independent" I mean
(and I think the context is clear) that you are
independent of BP. You are not subject to its direction or
control.... The "Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for
Interim and Final Claims" similarly recognizes that you
are "a neutral fund administrator" and the GCCF "is an
independent facility." 06
Professor Gillers also asserted, "[t]he fact that BP has an
interest in the success of the GCCF does not make you its agent or
its lawyer. Nor does the fact that BP is paying you for your
services do so."107 One is struck by such a breezy dismissal of the
obvious: that Kenneth Feinberg, the lawyer, represents BP and is
its agent to help it to meet its statutory obligations under the Oil
Pollution Act. That statutory duty cannot be transferred to a
third party. BP's employment of Feinberg Rozen as its agent is
permissible but BP is obligated to make sure that Feinberg meets
the company's responsibilities. To that end, Protocols have been
developed by Feinberg, whose settlement authority is tied by his
105. See Letter from Stephen Gillers, Prof. of Law, New York Univ., to
Kenneth Feinberg, Administrator, Gulf Coast Claims Facility (Dec. 28, 2010),
available at http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/GillersFeinbergDoc
2010.pdf.
106. Id. (quoting Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and
Final Claims, GULF COAST CLAiMs FAciLITY (November 22, 2010),
http://www.scribd.coml doc/45804679/BP-facility-claims-protocol).
107. Id.
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Agreement with BP to the terms of the Oil Pollution Act. 108
Although Feinberg's settlement authority is relatively broad,
it is constrained in important ways. Perhaps the most important
is that in order to obtain a final settlement from BP, a claimant
must give up all claims against all parties arising from the
Deepwater Horizon catastrophe.109 The prescribed form of release
specifies that Feinberg may not settle a claim against BP without
also obtaining for BP an agreement that the claimant shall pursue
no other claims against any other party arising from the Gulf oil
spill."l0 As Professor Geoffrey Hazard pointed out in a declaration
under oath in January 2011 (submitted in support of the motion to
supervise), the release encompasses punitive damages claims, a
category of damages that the BP/Feinberg Agreement does not
permit Feinberg to offer.II'
Yet BP and Feinberg have, despite BP's statutory duties, its
ownership of the assets, and its general control of the claims
process, called Feinberg a "neutral fund administrator."l 2 In an
108. GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, FINAL RULE GOVERNING PAYMENT
OPTIONs, ELIGIBILITY AND SUBSTANTIATION CRITERIA, AND FINAL PAYMENT
METHODOLOGY, supra note 89, at 1.
109. The GCCF claims protocol provides that
By applying for a Final Payment, an applicant is seeking to resolve
all claims including any claims for future damages resulting from
the Spill. A Final Payment constitutes a complete and final
resolution of all claims for any past, current, or future losses that a
Claimant has or may have with regard to the Deepwater Horizon
incident and oil spill against BP and all other potentially liable
parties, except as otherwise noted in [ this Protocol. Accepting a
Final Payment requires the Claimant to sign a release of past and
future claims. . . . In determining the Final Payment, the GCCF will
take into account and offset prior payments by BP, the GCCF, and
collateral sources.
Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims (Feb. 8,
2011), supra note 100.
110. See id.
111. See Declaration Of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. at 5, In re Oil Spill by the
Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf Of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL
No. 2179 (E.D. La. Jan 17, 2011), available at http://www.courthouse
news.com/2011/01/21/Expert.pdf.
112. The Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final
Claims, November 10, 2010, declared:
The GCCF is administered by Kenneth R. Feinberg ("the Claims
Administrator"), a neutral fund administrator responsible for all
decisions relating to the administration and processing of claims by
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affidavit Geir Robinson, director of BP Claims, asserted that
Feinberg was "jointly appointed by the White House and BP"ll 3
a claim the White House never made.
In his advice to Feinberg in response to the plaintiffs' motion
for supervision"l 4 by the MDL judge in the putative class action
pending in federal court in Louisiana, Gillers stretches the
meaning of "independent" and "neutral" beyond plausibility,
writing that the GCCF's self-proclaimed Protocol for Interim and
Final Claims provides
that BP may appeal any of your awards over
$500,000.... These provisions are wholly inconsistent
with the notion that you are BP's lawyer or its agent.
Principals do not appeal the decisions of their agents.
Agents exist to serve the interests of principals within the
scope of the agency. The fact that BP has an interest in
the success of the GCCF does not make you its agent or its
lawyer. Nor does the fact that BP is paying you for your
services do so. While payment to a lawyer can be some
evidence of a professional relationship with the payer,
payment is neither sufficient by itself nor necessary to
create an attorney-client relationship. In fact, payment
from BP, rather than from the fund itself, avoids a
conflict between the interests of those who seek
compensation from the fund and your interests if you
were also relegated to compensation from the very same
the GCCF. While the GCCF is an independent facility, it is
important that the views of all stakeholders be considered. All
stakeholders, including claimants, government entities, and BP, may
provide input and comments regarding the GCCF process.
Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, supra note
100 (emphasis added).
113. See Declaration Of Geir Robinson at 2, In Re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
"Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179
(E.D. La. Jan. 7, 2011) (asserting that there is no attorney-client relationship
between BP and Feinberg); see also Letter from Stephen Gillers, Prof. of Law,
supra note 105.
114. See Motion to Supervise Ex Parte Communications Between BP
Defendants and Putative Class Members, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
"Deepwater Horizon" In The Gulf Of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No.
2179 (E.D. La Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/
packages/pdf/national/20101221_SUPERVISEMOTIONDOC.pdf.
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fund. 115
But a fair reading of the provision and the BP Feinberg
Agreement 1 l6 demonstrates the opposite:
* The "fund" has no independent existence: any funds
deposited in an escrow account belong to BP until
they are lawfully committed to a claimant.
* BP retains a right to terminate the Agreement if it
does not conform to Protocols.
* BP has specified a right of appeal to a panel of
arbitrators if Feinberg settles a case in excess of
$500,000.' 1"
* Feinberg is obligated to abide by the OPA. If a Final
claim "presents an issue of first impression under
OPA," Feinberg may "grant" BP a "right of appeal."
* BP is statutorily obligated to pay interim and final
damage claims and the costs of cleanup by state and
federal authorities. Delegation of these duties to an
"independent contractor" cannot change the fact of
BP's strict and vicarious liability as a responsible
party under the OPA.
* BP is therefore obligated to oversee Feinberg's
115. Letter from Stephen Gillers, supra note 105 (emphasis added).
116. See Agreement between BP Exploration and Production Inc. and
Feinberg Rozen, LLP, supra note 96.
117. The GCCF's November 10, 2010 Protocol for Interim and Final
claims provides that
The Claimant may appeal a Final Claim determination of the GCCF
if a total monetary award (including any Emergency, Interim or
Final Payment made by BP or the GCCF) is in excess of $250,000.
BP may appeal a Final Claim Determination of the GCCF if a total
monetary award (including any Emergency, Interim or Final
Payment made by BP or the GCCF) is in excess of $500,000. . . . If
either the claimant or BP asserts that the Final Claim: a) presents
an issue of first impression under OPA; or b) that the determination
of the GCCF is inconsistent with prior legal precedent under OPA
and that the Final Claim is likely to be representative of a larger
category of claims to be considered by the GCCF, then a right to
appeal may be granted by the Claims Administrator in his sole
discretion.
Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, supra note
100.
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performance since BP's satisfaction of its duties
cannot be avoided by pointing to breaches of duty by
Feinberg.
* BP not only pays Feinberg directly, it has agreed to
fully indemnify him and his firm for any liabilities
they incur in carrying out BP's statutory obligations
(save for misconduct).
* The BP-Feinberg Rozen Agreement allows Feinberg
Rozen to use "BP assets" such as "computers,
equipment, furniture, properties, infrastructure and
other assets" - without charge.
* BP owns the information developed by Feinberg
Rozen including its attorney work product and its
claims evaluations. The Agreement provides that
upon termination "Feinberg Rozen shall return, and
shall cause its Subcontractors to return, to BP any
and all Claims Information in its and their possession
or control as to which Feinberg Rozen has concluded
making all independent judgments regarding the
processing of Claims."
* BP may terminate the agreement on 30 days notice in
the event of a "material[] breach" and on 10 days
notice if Feinberg Rozen "breaches its fiduciary
obligations ... to administer and resolve Claims in
accordance with the Claims Protocols."1 18
* Despite these unmistakable indicia of agency, BP and
Feinberg in their Agreement had declared:
At the request of the White House and BP, Kenneth R.
Feinberg ("Feinberg"), acting through and as a partner of
Feinberg Rozen, has established the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility ("GCCF") to independently administer and where
appropriate settle and authorize the payment of certain
Claims asserted against BP as a result of the explosion at
the Deepwater Horizon rig and consequent spillage of oil
into the Gulf of Mexico (the "Event").
118. Agreement between BP Exploration and Production Inc. and
Feinberg Rozen, LLP, supra note 96, at 1-12 (emphasis added).
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Independent of whom? Of BP who funded the operation? Of BP on
whose behalf Feinberg was obtaining general releases and
freedom from the burden of litigation? BP and Feinberg's claims
of independence earned Bronx cheers from Gulf Coast Attorneys
General and plaintiffs' lawyers.
The White House, after meetings with BP executives,
announced the BP offer to set aside funds to satisfy its claims
obligations through a mechanism administered by Kenneth
Feinberg. But contrary to the statement's implication, Feinberg
did not act as a public agent, though the White House had openly
employed Feinberg's aura.1 19  Nor is it accurate to say that
Feinberg "established" the Gulf Coast Claims Facility. BP did. It
is BP's money, and Feinberg is BP's lawyer - or one of them. He
may, by contract, have defined the scope of his undertaking
(perfectly appropriate under Rule 1.2), but an undertaking by a
non-lawyer, with the consent of a lawyer, to rely on the
professional skills of a lawyer establishes an attorney-client
relationship regardless of the subjective beliefs of the parties. The
Restatement of the Law (Third): the Law Governing Lawyers
explains
The client-lawyer relationship contemplates legal services
from the lawyer, not, for example, real-estate-brokerage
services or expert-witness services. A client-lawyer
relationship results when legal services are provided even
if the client also intends to receive other services. 120
Any consensual undertaking by one for the benefit of another
(and certainly all those undertaken for pay) establishes an agency
relationship. Here, the principal is BP and Feinberg and his law
firm are its agents. The Restatement (Third) of Agency makes
this clear:
Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one
person (a "principal") manifests assent to another person
(an "agent") that the agent shall act on the principal's
119. See Jesse Lee, A New Process and a New Escrow Account for Gulf Oil
Spill Claims from BP, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 17, 2010 2:35 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/06/17/a-new-process-and-a-new-escrow-
account-gulf-oil-spill-claims-bp.
120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. c
(2000).
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behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the
agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act. 121
The Feinberg-BP Agreement's self-serving disclaimers of
agency, of attorney-client relationship, and its assertion that
Feinberg is an independent contractor are not dispositive.122 It is
the law of agency and the behavior and function of the party that
are dispositive, not self-serving language designed to enhance
Feinberg's aura and avoid the taint of being BP's lawyer.
It is also noteworthy that the Agreement between BP and
Feinberg Rozen for the conduct of "claims settlement services"
includes duties of loyalty, and affirms BP's right to terminate the
relationship if Feinberg Rozen fails to "perform its obligations
hereunder in a manner that is consistent with the principles
stated in BP's Code of Conduct, a copy of which has been provided
to Feinberg Rozen, and any revised or successor code of
conduct." 23  We have not seen the BP Code of Conduct but
faithful service must be one requirement. The duty and
expectation of loyalty underlies BP's commitment to indemnify
Feinberg Rozen and its agents. The Agreement provides that:
[T]o the maximum extent permissible by law, Feinberg
and Feinberg Rozen shall incur no liability to BP or its
Affiliates by reason of acts or things done, suffered or
omitted in performing the Services in strict accordance
with the terms and conditions of this Agreement, except
where the liability arose out of the gross negligence or
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
122. The BP-Feinberg Rozen Agreement provides:
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR; NO AGENCY[.] It is the express
intention of the parties that Feinberg Rozen shall be an independent
contractor throughout the Term of this Agreement. Except as
otherwise agreed to by the parties, nothing in this Agreement shall
in any way be construed to constitute Feinberg Rozen as an agent or
representative of BP, and Feinberg Rozen shall otherwise perform
the Services hereunder as an independent contractor. The execution
of this Agreement shall not be construed to create an attorney-client
relationship between BP and Feinberg Rozen, and the provision of
Services hereunder shall not constitute, or be otherwise construed to
constitute, provision of legal advice from Feinberg Rozen, or any of
its partners or employees, to BP.
Agreement between BP Exploration and Production Inc. and Feinberg Rozen,
LLP, supra note 96, at 10.
123. Id. at 7.
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intentional or willful misconduct of the Feinberg Rozen
Indemnitee. 124
Driven by practical necessity, such as the one year Louisiana
statute of limitations for property damage, claimants filed
lawsuits, which were consolidated for the enhanced case
management of federal MDL procedures. 125 All such claims were
compelled by the OPA to be presented to the designated
"responsible party" before suit could be commenced,126 so the
GCCF was sure to see each new claim. Conventional maritime
tort, personal injury and wrongful death actions were filed against
BP for damages - both compensatory and punitive. (Although
Feinberg did not appear in court to defend such claims, he had the
authority to negotiate settlements.) Some claimants sought
certification as representatives of a class. Plaintiffs seeking
temporary assistance had to apply to the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility, which Feinberg managed.
The BP-Feinberg Agreement declared that Feinberg is an
"independent contractor," and that there is no "attorney-client
relationship" with BP. But such disclaimers cannot erase the fact
that Feinberg and his firm were delegated broad authority to
accomplish for BP what lawyers widely do: negotiate claims and
obtain general releases freeing the client from the burdens of
future or pending litigation. Feinberg's broad assertions of
independence prompted an innovative "motion for supervision" by
attorneys for claimants who had filed suit in the federal court
actions consolidated in the Eastern District of Louisiana.127 The
lawyers asked the court to "supervise" Feinberg's conduct, as a
court might do in exercise of its equity powers in a class action.
According to plaintiffs' lawyers Feinberg and the GCCF often
dealt directly with claimants in a way that did not inform
claimants that they represented BP - an apparent violation of the
124. Id. at 3.
125. See e.g., Order, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in
the Gulf Of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Aug. 24, 2010)
(consolidating a complaint filed by several of the Deepwater Horizon's
managing owners and operators with the Louisiana Multi-District
Litigation).
126, See 33 U.S.C. § 2713 (2006).
127. See Motion to Supervise Ex Parte Communications Between BP
Defendants and Putative Class Members, supra note 114, at 1.
2012] 175
176 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:137
Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 4.3 commands that when
dealing with an unrepresented person "a lawyer shall not state or
imply that the lawyer is disinterested."l 28
District Judge Carl J. Barbier, managing the MDL, asserted
jurisdiction - over Feinberg and BP's objections. In granting relief
the judge relied alternatively on the fact that some plaintiffs
asserted they were members of a class deserving of certification
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and on the statutory
requirement of § 2705 of the OPA that a designated "responsible
party" must establish an interim claims process. That duty rests
with BP once it has been designated as "responsible party." The
duty cannot be delegated because it is a statutory obligation. BP
therefore must - and does in its Agreement - require that
Feinberg abide by the OPA.129 Judge Barbier considered both the
Gillers opinion and that of Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., who
asserted that Feinberg certainly is BP's agent, whether one calls
that tie an attorney-client relationship or not. 130
In my view there is plainly an attorney client relationship.
The attorney-client relationship is but a species of the genus
principal-agent. An attorney's Rule 1.2 and 1.3 duties of
competence and diligence cannot be waived by a client. And the
lawyer's duty to maintain confidences is imposed by Rule 1.6
except to the extent waived. The breezy assertion by Professor
Gillers that Feinberg owes no duty of confidentiality finds no
support in the Agreement between BP and Feinberg Rozen, which
explicitly provides for maintenance of confidentiality.131
128. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2009).
129. See Agreement between BP Exploration and Production Inc. and
Feinberg Rozen, LLP, supra note 96, at 6.
130. See Letter from Stephen Gillers, supra note 105; Declaration Of
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr, supra note 111, at 7.
131. The agreement between BP and Feinberg Rozen sets forth the
confidentiality obligations of the parties:
A party (each a "Disclosing Party") may disclose its Confidential
Information to the other party (a "Receiving Party") in connection
with the performance of their respective obligations under this
Agreement. For the purposes of this Agreement, "Confidential
Information" shall mean all information revealed by or through the
Disclosing Party which the Receiving Party either knows or
reasonably should know to be proprietary and confidential in nature
including without limitation: (i) information either expressly or
implicitly identified as originating with or belonging to the
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Judge Barbier unsurprisingly found as fact
that the hybrid role of Mr. Feinberg and the GCCF has
led to confusion and misunderstanding by claimants,
especially those who are unrepresented by their own
counsel, the Court finds that certain precautions should
be taken to protect the interests of claimants - narrowly
tailored in accordance with the First Amendment. The
clear record in this case demonstrates that any claim of
the GCCF's neutrality and independence is misleading to
putative class members and is a direct threat to this
ongoing litigation, as claimants must sign a full release
against all potential defendants before obtaining final
payments.132
Judge Barbier ordered Feinberg and BP to, among other things,
Refrain from referring to the GCCF, Ken Feinberg, or
Feinberg Rozen, LLP (or their representatives), as
"neutral" or completely "independent" from BP. It should
be clearly disclosed in all communications, whether
written or oral, that said parties are acting for and on
behalf of BP in fulfilling its statutory obligations as the
"responsible party" under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.133
Feinberg complied, amending the GCCF website and the Protocol
to state
The GCCF is intended to replace BP's claims facility for
Individuals and Businesses. The GCCF and its Claims
Administrator, Kenneth R. Feinberg, act for and on
behalf of BP in fulfilling BP's statutory obligations as a
"responsible party" under OPA. The GCCF (and the
Disclosing Party or marked or disclosed as confidential (including
information disclosed to the Disclosing Party by a third party,
including a Subcontractor, under an obligation of confidentiality);
and (ii) information traditionally recognized as proprietary or trade
secrets of the Disclosing Party.
Agreement between BP Exploration and Production Inc. and Feinberg Rozen,
LLP, supra note 96, at 3.
132. Order and Reasons at 12-13, In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
"Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179
(E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011), ECF No. 1098 (citation omitted), available at
http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/2220110rderonRecDoc9l2.pdf.
133. Id. at 14.
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protocols under which it operates) are structured to be
compliant with OPA.134
Barbier's assertion of supervisory jurisdiction over a private
claims facility is an innovative step. 135 But it is of a piece with
recent trends by judges who are managing aggregated litigation,
as Judge Fallon described in his 2008 essay. Judge Jack
Weinstein in the Zyprexa MDL consolidated product liability
litigation, characterized the aggregation of product liability claims
as a "quasi-class action," which enabled the court to exercise
control over attorneys' fees, which are normally the province of
private agreement between attorney and client. 136  Similarly
Judge Alvin Hellerstein has asserted the right to control
attorneys' fees, and even the terms of settlement, in the
consolidated litigation before him arising from 9/11,137 including
the massive personal injury claims filed by those who worked on
the smoking pile of debris without adequate safety equipment.
The Administrator's claims of neutrality and misstatement
134. The February 8, 2011 version of the GCCF Protocol also states:
Whether or not a claim has been presented shall be governed by
OPA and applicable law. All documentation submitted by
Individuals or Businesses in support of claims filed with the BP
Claims Process have been transferred to the GCCF. BP has also
authorized the GCCF to process certain non-OPA claims involving
physical injury or death. Acceptance of payments offered pursuant to
this Protocol shall be wholly voluntary, and participation in the
GCCF shall not affect any right that the Claimant would have had
absent such participation unless final resolution of the claim is
achieved.
Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims (Feb. 8,
2011), supra note 100.
135. The Manual for Complex Litigation discusses precertification
communications with the proposed class. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION, supra note 2, at § 21.12 (4d ed. 2004). It enjoins "false,
misleading, or intimidating information." Id. Rule 23 certification of a class
is unlikely in the Gulf cases, so Barbier's exercise of supervisory authority is
quite bold.
136. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262
(E.D.N.Y. 2006).
137. See Order Approving Modified and Improved Agreement of
Settlement at 2, In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, Nos. 21-
MC-100 to -103 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2010), ECF No. 3804, available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/52514730/WTC-cleanup-cases-Order-Approving-
Settlement. See generally World Trade Center Disaster - 9/11 cleanup
cases/Zadroga bill, TORTs TODAY, http://tortstoday.blogspot.com/p/world-
trade-center-disaster-911-cleanup.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
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were a significant misstep. Kenneth Feinberg was judicially
compelled to acknowledge that he is not an independent, neutral
administrator, but rather that he is BP's agent for claims
resolution. Feinberg's offers of early settlement of future loss
claims are burdened by the belated and compelled
acknowledgment that he is BP's agent. The crown he has worn
has been tarnished. Skepticism1 38 greeted his reliance on a report
by the Texas A&M scientist John W. Tunnell, Jr. who (quite
tentatively) predicted a continued strong recovery of the fisheries.
Similarly, demands for more documentation may be greeted with
skepticism that he is bending in response to BP's public
complaints that he has been too generous and has demanded too
little documentation.139
Complaints have persisted. Plaintiffs' counsel have filed a
supplemental motion to supervise, seeking the appointment of a
special master because they allege that
BP is in violation of OPA's requirement to establish an
interim claim process and to pay interim claims; that BP,
through its [GCCF], has violated the spirit of the Court's
Order seeking to protect plaintiffs and putative class
members from confusion and misunderstanding; and that
the releases obtained from plaintiffs and other putative
class members are invalid and should not be enforced. 140
The GCCF, they assert, has made the interim claims process
so slow and burdensome that claimants, desperate for cash, have
138. See Editorial, Gulf Oil Spill Damages, Phase Two, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
13, 2011, at A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/
opinion/14mon2.html.
139. Feinberg invited public comment on his proposed methodology. He
posted the responses on the GCCF website, but with names redacted,
although at least one appears to be from BP. See Comments of With Respect
to The Gulf Coast Claims Facility's Draft Proposal Governing Payment
Options, Eligibility And Substantiation Criteria, And Final Payment
Methodology (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.scribd.com/doc/49355938/BP-
Comments-on-Feinberg-GCCF-Proposed-Payments-for-Gulf-Oil-Spill. There
was also a flood of public comments. BP has declared that the Gulf Coast has
bounced back and complains that Feinberg's offers have been too generous.
See Campbell Robertson, No Vacancies, but Some Reservations, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2011, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/
us/16gulf.html.
140. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief in Support of Supervision over the BP
Interim Claims Process, supra note 13, at 1.
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accepted Quick Payments, which require execution of a general
release,141 a process which Gulf Coast Attorneys General have
faulted.142 Yet BP contends that the Gulf economy is strong and
Feinberg has been too generous in his settlement offers.143
SOME PRELIMINARY LESSONS OF THE GCCF EXPERIENCE
We have long been concerned to establish mechanisms for
prompt satisfaction of claims of injury by those who suffered at
the hands of others. Workers compensation, FELA, the Jones Act,
and common law tort claims have developed in response to that
need. One of the most problematic aspects of the ordinary
common law tort mechanism is the lump-sum nature of the jury
verdict and resulting judgment. Here, the OPA compels a
responsible party to develop a mechanism by which interim claims
can be met. BP has responded to the statute's commands to pay
interim claims. But, the BP GCCF's approach suffers from the
vagueness of its "protocol"; its announced standards of judgment.
Nor is there any mechanism for public review of whether the
polluter is meeting its statutory obligations. Unlike litigated
global settlement funds like Vioxx or the World Trade Center
clean-up workers' cases, the GCCF is a one-way street. Claimants
have a voice but no vote. The assertion of supervisory jurisdiction
by MDL Judge Barbier was an important step in clearing the air
of self-serving and misleading claims of independence and
neutrality, but courts have rightly long been loath to take on
substantial management tasks.
Generally, a provision is made in the litigated funds
component for the financing and neutral management of the
distribution. Here, there is no such neutral agent. The money
141. See id. at 6-7; see also Alejandro de los Rios, Plaintiffs Challenge
GCCF's OPA Compliance Filed in BP Oil Spill MDL, LOUISIANA RECORD (July
7, 2011, 8:53 Pl), http://www.louisianarecord.comlnews/237155-plaintiffs-
challenge-gccfs-opa-compliance-filed-in-bp-oil-spill-mdl; John Schwartz, Man
With $20 Billion to Disburse Finds No Shortage of Claims or Critics, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2011, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/
19/us/19feinberg.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnx=1316875235-SG8J4G9iPDa7QOVo
IlKTyw.
142. See Canfield, supra note 21.
143. See Supplemental Comments of BP Exploration & Production Inc. at
2-3, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY (July 7, 2011), http://www.gulfcoastclaims
facility.com/BP_7_7_1 _SupplementalComment.pdf.
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and the liability belong to BP. And the litigatedlagreed settlement
fund customarily contains a "grid," which provides transparent,
objective criteria for determining the share of the fund to which a
claimant is entitled.144 That is both a cost and a benefit of
litigation.
FILLING THE REGULATORY GAP
Perhaps the largest failure to date is that of the Executive
branch, which has failed to use its statutory authority under the
OPA to issue regulations governing such private claims facilities
as the GCCF. Because the statute mandates interim benefits, and
because the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund is contingently liable in
the event the polluter becomes insolvent, there is ample reason for
the Executive to monitor and to set guidelines and transparency
requirements from the first.
Although courts, such as the bankruptcy courts, oversee
complex corporate transformations, it is strategic decisions, not
claim-by-claim management that is the courts' strong suit. Here
we have a mandated process of interim and final claims, but no
regular way to determine if that process is being responsibly
conducted. In an oil spill, the "debtor" remains in possession and
conducts an unsupervised compensatory program - like the
GCCF. One cannot say there is a "fund." There are simply
outstanding obligations, which the "responsible party" has begun
to meet. Section 2705 of the OPA is a strong enough foundation
on which to build a set of regulations that will guide and control
entities like BP in the event of a disaster.
The essential elements of a regulatory scheme for Interim
Claims are plain enough. Oil companies are strictly liable for oil
spills. They are obligated to clean up and restore the
environment, and to promptly compensate those who are injured
by the spill. Like employers under the workers compensation
laws, the OPA requires compensation to be paid during periods of
temporary disability and impairment.
If a company designated as a responsible party in an oil spill
wants to manage its own response to its statutory obligations, the
polluter should be obligated to promptly report its plan for
144. See e.g, VIoxx SETTLEMENT DOCUMENTS, supra note 11; World Trade
Center Settlement Process Agreement, As Amended, supra note 11.
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efficient compensation of those who it has harmed to a competent
and responsible government agency. Proper disclosure of the
interests of all parties would surely be one requirement. There
should be clear statements of the legal standards being applied to
both extent of liability and to proof of damages, and the financial
capacity of the company to satisfy its obligations should also be
disclosed, subject to public review and comment, as well as audit
by public authority.
CONCLUSION
Judge Barbier has correctly granted the plaintiffs' motion to
supervise the GCCF. But he needs help. It should come first from
the Executive branch, which is the most capable of developing
adequate structures for such contingencies as we see in the Gulf.
We need to develop a procedure for formalization and regulation of
§ 2705 spill claims payment schemes like the GCCF. In the
coming period, attention should be given to whether the courts in
mass tort litigation should exercise direct supervisory control over
claims payment procedures such as those mandated by the OPA.
The supervisory power of the MDL court is inevitably ad hoc,
case-by-case. Despite agency fragmentation, executive
enforcement seems more promising. Executive enforcement of the
OPA is divided among agencies. Designation of the responsible
party is assigned to the Coast Guard (part of Homeland Security)
as well as supervision of the oil spill trust fund pursuant to 26
U.S.C. § 2909; oversight of a restoration plan is assigned to the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (part
of the Department of Commerce).1 45 Permission to drill and civil
penalties for violations are administered by the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE)
(part of the Department of the Interior).146  BOEMRE does
require, as part of its approval process for a covered offshore
facility, proof of financial responsibility. But it does not govern
145. NOAA has asserted jurisdiction over post-spill restoration plans,
noting that "[t]he goal of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), 33 U.S.C. 2701
et seq., is to make the environment and public whole for injuries to natural
resources and services resulting from an incident involving a discharge or
substantial threat of a discharge of oil (incident)." 15 C.F.R. § 990.10 (2011).
146. 33 C.F.R. 250.1400 (2010).
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the post-spill administration. 147
The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund administered by the Coast
Guard makes payment of claims only for uncompensated removal
costs and damages, research and development.
In reviewing the BP Gulf oil spill Congress should look at this
regulatory gap. There are no regulations that govern the manner
in which a solvent polluter meets its statutory clean-up and
compensation responsibilities. There is no audit, no reporting, no
monitoring of the company's ability to meet its obligations, no
review of its success in doing so. In my view aggregated litigation
on the MDL model is an inefficient mechanism for this. Some
standing authority is needed. An agency that is competent,
willing, and adequately funded to undertake this responsibility
needs to be identified. Whether this undertaking can best be met
by the Coast Guard or elsewhere in the sprawling Homeland
Security Department, the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Commerce, Justice or Treasury Departments is less important
than recognition that major environmental spills are likely to
occur. We need an administrative framework for oversight of
claims processes from the beginning - not just when the
responsible party has become insolvent. If the executive branch
does not take this up, Congress in its oversight capacity should do
so.
147. See 30 C.F.R. §§ 253.1-253.62 (2010); see also National Pollution
Funds Center, U.S. COAST GUARD, http://www.useg.millnpfc/ (last modified
Apr. 15, 2011).
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